We can succeed in Iraq
Alex Gallo
Issue date: 12/6/06 Section: Op-Ed
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The United States must not hastily withdraw from Iraq. As a former Army officer who served in Samarra, Iraq in 2004, I witnessed the stakes and consequences of inaction or withdrawal from this fight.
There are many innocent Iraqis who simply want to raise their families and live their lives. Yet they remain caught in the crossfire of a humanitarian crisis that, if left unabated, will devolve into an all-out civil war and possibly even genocide. I recommend that the United States implement the following three-part plan to address the humanitarian crisis, end sectarian violence and reinforce the legitimacy and governing resolve of the Iraqi central government.
First, increase the number of troops in Iraq by 60,000-100,000 with the stated purpose of dismantling the militias. The troop increase will simultaneously provide the US military with the flexibility to amass forces in key areas like Baghdad while maintaining pressure on the insurgents throughout the Sunni Triangle. The force structure will also scale back the violence, allowing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to retake the lead in Baghdad and throughout the Sunni Triangle. The US military can then revert back to its oversight role.
Following the redeployment of the surged troops, the US should reposition 140,000 remaining troops. First, send a portion of the Syrian and Iranian borders to end the transfer and movement of weapons, equipment, fighters and money. Position a reinforced division in Baghdad to execute targeted, intelligence-driven raids, because Baghdad is the center of gravity in this fight. Additionally, the US should maintain a reinforced brigade-sized strike force in the Sunni Triangle to capture or kill high value targets and aid the ISF when they require reinforcement.
The ISF, with US oversight, should take the lead in the interior of the country. Also, hold a reinforced brigade in reserve in Kuwait.
Second, clearly align US units with Iraqi units, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their organizational systems as well as fostering a professional ethic within the ISF. In my unit's experience in Iraq, we discovered that training the ISF demands a holistic approach. The current policy of embedding 10-15 person teams to advise the ISF is a recipe for disaster and ultimately undermines the United States' strategic objectives in Iraq.
There are many innocent Iraqis who simply want to raise their families and live their lives. Yet they remain caught in the crossfire of a humanitarian crisis that, if left unabated, will devolve into an all-out civil war and possibly even genocide. I recommend that the United States implement the following three-part plan to address the humanitarian crisis, end sectarian violence and reinforce the legitimacy and governing resolve of the Iraqi central government.
First, increase the number of troops in Iraq by 60,000-100,000 with the stated purpose of dismantling the militias. The troop increase will simultaneously provide the US military with the flexibility to amass forces in key areas like Baghdad while maintaining pressure on the insurgents throughout the Sunni Triangle. The force structure will also scale back the violence, allowing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to retake the lead in Baghdad and throughout the Sunni Triangle. The US military can then revert back to its oversight role.
Following the redeployment of the surged troops, the US should reposition 140,000 remaining troops. First, send a portion of the Syrian and Iranian borders to end the transfer and movement of weapons, equipment, fighters and money. Position a reinforced division in Baghdad to execute targeted, intelligence-driven raids, because Baghdad is the center of gravity in this fight. Additionally, the US should maintain a reinforced brigade-sized strike force in the Sunni Triangle to capture or kill high value targets and aid the ISF when they require reinforcement.
The ISF, with US oversight, should take the lead in the interior of the country. Also, hold a reinforced brigade in reserve in Kuwait.
Second, clearly align US units with Iraqi units, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their organizational systems as well as fostering a professional ethic within the ISF. In my unit's experience in Iraq, we discovered that training the ISF demands a holistic approach. The current policy of embedding 10-15 person teams to advise the ISF is a recipe for disaster and ultimately undermines the United States' strategic objectives in Iraq.
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